In, From, and to Space: Safeguarding the United States of America and Her Interests by Kim, Peter Y.
 
1157 
IN, FROM, AND TO SPACE:  SAFEGUARDING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND HER INTERESTS 
PETER Y. KIM* 
“Space:  the final frontier . . . to boldly go where no man has gone 
before.”1 
– Captain James T. Kirk 
ABSTRACT 
This Comment serendipitously pays homage to Professor Bin 
Cheng’s Studies in International Space Law, by re-examining topics 
covered in his trailblazing work and by exploring how the United 
States Space Force may exist under current international law.  
Although military use of outer space is limited by international 
treaties and customary law, the United States of America must be 
prepared to protect her interests from future threats.  Cue the Space 
Force, which will need to navigate a novel theater of war and 
anticipate legal consequences under space law, the law of war, and 
the law of the sea.  Using the present legal framework is only the 
beginning, as only time will tell how space warfare will unfold. 
 
 *  J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2020; 
B.A., Boston College, 2009.  This Comment was written in partial satisfaction of 
degree requirements at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of 
Law.  Thank you to Professor Geoffrey R. Watson for being my supervising 
instructor; to Christina Lara, Meaghan Jennison, and Jennifer Brooker for being true 
friends; to Quinn Dunkak, Nathan Gill, Danuta Egle, and the rest of the University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law editors for your fantastic work in revising 
this Comment; and to God because nothing is impossible with Him. 
 1  Cyriaque Lamar, Read the first drafts of the Star Trek opening monologue, 
GIZMODO (Dec. 4, 2011, 3:15 PM), https://io9.gizmodo.com/read-the-first-drafts-
of-the-star-trek-opening-monologu-5864819 [https://perma.cc/JK8R-GJEQ]. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eight years before Apollo 11 astronaut Neil Armstrong uttered 
his eleven mythical words that forever changed humanity’s 
relationship with the moon, 2  President John F. Kennedy rallied 
Congress and Americans to dream of space.3   On September 12, 
1962, at a time when the United States appeared to be falling behind 
in the space race,4 President Kennedy delivered a speech that noted 
the challenges ahead: 
Whether [space] will become a force for good or ill depends 
on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-
eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea 
of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.  I do not say . . . we 
should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of 
space any more than we go unprotected against the hostile 
use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be explored 
and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without 
repeating the mistakes that man has made . . . .5 
 
 2 Olivia B. Waxman, Lots of People Have Theories About Neil Armstrong’s ‘One 
Small Step for Man’ Quote. Here’s What We Really Know, TIME (July 15, 2019, 12:39 PM 
EDT), https://time.com/5621999/neil-armstrong-quote/ 
[https://perma.cc/YSR8-X53W] (“At 10:56 p.m. ET on July 20, 1969, the American 
astronaut Neil Armstrong put his left foot on the lunar surface and famously 
declared, ‘That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.’”). 
 3 See John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Special Message 
to the Congress on Urgent National Needs (May 25, 1961) (transcript available in 




 On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy declared before Congress: 
[I]f we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between 
freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred 
in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 
1957 . . . . Now it is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American 
enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, 
which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 4  The Moon Decision, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, 
https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/apollo-to-the-moon/online/racing-to-
space/moon-decision.cfm [https://perma.cc/J4JA-ERUW]. 
 5  John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Address at Rice 
University on the Nation’s Space Effort (Sept. 12, 1962) (emphasis added), 
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Today, except for the occasional naysayer or conspiracy theorist, 
most people accept the universal truth that, in the summer of 1969, 
two American men walked on the moon.6 
An unlikely torchbearer of President Kennedy’s legacy and 
vision for space is former President Donald J. Trump.  Although, in 
2017, Representatives Jim Cooper (D-TN) and Mike Rogers (R-AL) 
introduced the idea of a “Space Corps”7 in a bipartisan House bill,8 
the concept went viral when President Trump shared five simple 
words—“Space Force all the way!”—on the social media platform 
Twitter. 9   On February 19, 2019, President Trump signed Space 
 
https://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm [https://perma.cc/Q63P-M36W].  
President Kennedy is often quoted for the following soundbite: 
We choose to go to the moon.  We choose to go to the moon in this decade 
and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are 
hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our 
energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to 
accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, 
and the others, too. 
Id. 
 6 Elizabeth Howell, Moon Landing Hoax Still Lives On, 50 Years After Apollo 11. 
But Why?, SPACE.COM (July 19, 2019), https://www.space.com/apollo-11-moon-
landing-hoax-believers.html [https://perma.cc/USM5-F9UD] (citing an estimate 
by former NASA chief historian Roger Launius, who recently reported that 
approximately “5% of Americans believe the Apollo moon landings were faked”); 
see also Olivia McKelvey, Conspiracy theorist punched by Buzz Aldrin still insists moon 
landing was fake, USA TODAY (July 20, 2019, 8:22 AM ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/20/man-punched-
buzz-aldrin-still-says-moon-landing-fake/1784847001/ [https://perma.cc/4BHE-
YQYV] (“Yet half a century later, despite other moon landings, moon rocks and 
firsthand accounts from countless members of the 400,000-strong workforce who 
helped achieve JFK’s goal, some still believe the moon landings were staged in a 
Hollywood studio.”). 
 7 Congressman Proposes A Military ‘Space Corps’, NPR (June 25, 2017, 8:06 AM 
ET), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/25/534286469/congressman-proposes-a-
military-space-corps [https://perma.cc/RF3J-MX78] (“There could be a new 
branch of the United States military in the near future, and its mandate will be outer 
space.  It’s not called Starfleet like ‘Star Trek,’ sadly.  It’s been named Space 
Corps.”). 
 8 See FY18 National Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. § 1601 
(2017), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170628/106123/BILLS-
115HR2810ih-STR.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7MG-THJN]. 
 9 Brett Samuels, Trump celebrates Pentagon proposal: ‘Space Force all the way!’, 
THE HILL (Aug. 9, 2018, 12:27 PM EDT), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/401094-trump-celebrates-
pentagon-proposal-space-force-all-the-way [https://perma.cc/6J9X-F2AX]; see also 
Eric Mack, US Space Force: Everything you need to know on its first anniversary, CNET 
(Dec. 20, 2020, 7:55 AM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/donald-trump-space-
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Policy Directive—4 (SPD-4), 10  “centralizing all military space 
functions under a new Space Force, which [would] be overseen by 
the Department of the Air Force.”11  Although the President could 
not unilaterally create a new military branch, 12  with renewed 
congressional support,13  on December 20, 2019, President Trump 
signed the United States Space Force (“Space Force”) into existence, 
as the “first new armed service since 1947 . . . .”14 
The United States Space Force Act (“the Act”) establishes the 
Space Force “as an armed force within the Department of the Air 
Force.”15  The Act prioritizes the following functions and duties for 
the new military branch: 
(c) FUNCTIONS.—The Space Force shall be organized, trained, 
and equipped to provide – 
 
force-everything-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/4JJK-3MYG] (noting that 
President Trump first mentioned a “Space Force” in a March 2018 speech to 
Marines).  
 10 See Donald J. Trump, Text of Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the 




 11  Valerie Insinna, Trump officially organizes the Space Force under the Air 




 12 See Jim Garamone, DOD Sends Space Force Legislation to Congress, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF.: DOD NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1771782/dod-
sends-space-force-legislation-to-congress/ [https://perma.cc/95M7-4DBX] 
(explaining that the Space Force legislation required passage in Congress). 
 13 Claudia Grisales, With Congressional Blessing, Space Force is Closer to Launch, 
NPR (Aug. 11, 2019, 7:00 AM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/11/743612373/with-congressional-blessing-
space-force-is-closer-to-launch [https://perma.cc/TJ9K-SDFS]. 
 14 Jim Garamone, Trump Signs Law Establishing U.S. Space Force, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF.: DOD NEWS (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/2046035/trump-signs-law-
establishing-us-space-force/ [https://perma.cc/77B6-S228] (“Trump signed the 
National Defense Authorization Act . . . [and a] provision of the voluminous law 
created the service that will be totally focused on organizing, training and 
equipping Space Force . . . .”). 
 15  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Subtitle D – 
United States Space Force, S. 1790, 116th Cong. § 9081(a) (2019) [hereinafter United 
States Space Force Act], https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-
116s1790enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AAG-ZWEK]. 
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(1) freedom of operation for the United States in, from, 
and to space; and 
(2) prompt and sustained space operations. 
(d) DUTIES. —It shall be the duty of the Space Force to— 
(1) protect the interests of the United States in space; 
(2) deter aggression in, from, and to space; and 
(3) conduct space operations.16 
This new military branch will likely conduct missions involving: 
(1) space support,17 (2) force enhancement,18 (3) space control,19 and 
(4) space force.20   The Space Force will accomplish its duties by 
among other things, shielding America’s satellites from attacks that 
“could threaten our everyday lives, from our cell phones to the 
electric grid to the military’s ability to launch nuclear weapons.”21  
During his confirmation hearing, former Defense Secretary Mark 
Esper called space a “warfighting domain . . . because the Russians 
and Chinese are making it that way.”22  More specifically, countries 
 
 16 Id. § 9081(c)–(d). 
 17  JEREMY RABKIN & JOHN YOO, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND 
SPACE WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR 196 (2017) (defining “space support” 
as “the launching of missiles and satellites and the management of satellites in 
orbit”). 
 18 Id. at 196–97 (describing the general aim of improving “the effectiveness of 
terrestrial military operations,” which includes passive surveillance and 
strengthened civilian and military support for terrestrial operations). 
 19 Id. at 198 (characterizing the third mission type as securing “the ability to 
freely use space to one’s benefit while denying it to opponents”). 
 20 Id. at 199 (stating missions will use “weapons systems based in orbit that 
can strike targets on the ground, in the air, or even in space”). 
 21 See Grisales, supra note 13. 
 22  Id. (emphasis added).  Defense Secretary Esper’s confirmation hearing 
opening statement observed: 
[T]he growing threats posed by great power competitors such as China 
and Russia warrant a re-focus to high intensity conflict across all of the 
Military Services.  This requires us to modernize our forces and capitalize 
on rapid technological advancements . . . ; and with your help, establish 
the United States Space Force. 
Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense Nominee, Department of Defense, Opening 
Statement at the Hearing to Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected 
Nomination of: Honorable Mark T. Esper to be Secretary of Defense Before the 
Committee on Armed Services 17 (July 16, 2019) (transcript available at Alderson 
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such as Russia, China, and India are already capable of destroying 
their own satellites.23  It follows that these same States are likewise 
equipped to shoot down America’s satellites.24  International law 
prohibits militarizing outer space, “but that has not stopped 
speculation on the usefulness of outer space as strategic military 
outposts and dominion of influence.”25  After all, World War III may 
be fought in space.26 
This Comment investigates how the United States may form a 
robust Space Force under current applicable law.  Part II examines, 
through the lens of space law, the necessary prescription for this 
new military branch, so it will not hinder the pacifistic objectives of 
international treaties.  Part III explores the law of war and rules of 
engagement for this untested warfront.  Part IV draws analogies to 
the law of the sea for how military operations will occur in the high 
tide of space.  Part V advises policymaking and international 
cooperation as the mechanisms to develop a cohesive 
understanding on space warfare.  This Comment concludes with 
additional considerations in the implementation of the Space Force. 
II. SPACE LAW ACROSS THE UNIVERSE 
During his transition to the White House, President-Elect 
Kennedy received a January 10, 1961 Ad Hoc Committee on Space 
Report (the “Wiesner Report”) identifying both ballistic missiles and 
military space systems as space activities.27  The Wiesner Report 
 
 23 Grisales, supra note 13. 
 24 Grisales, supra note 13. 
 25  GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN THE AIRSPACE AND 
OUTER SPACE 266 (1st ed. 2012). 
 26 Mark R. Whittington, Deterring World War III with Trump’s Space Force, THE 
HILL (July 5, 2018, 6:00 PM EDT), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/395705-deterring-world-war-iii-with-
trumps-space-force [https://perma.cc/9RHJ-AT6E] (“A United States Space Force, 
dedicated to defending America’s assets beyond the Earth and to place those of an 
enemy at risk, would be an instrument for making sure that war never breaks out.”). 
 27  MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, JENIFER K. LAMIE & MARIA-VITTORIA “GIUGI” 
CARMINATI, THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDE FOR NEW SPACE LAWYERS 73 (2012) 
(noting that Professor Jerome B. Wiesner of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) led the “first-of-its-kind” transition team on space issues); Wiesner Committee, 
“Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space,” January 10, 1961, 
NASA [hereinafter Wiesner Committee], 
https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/report61.html 
[https://perma.cc/B2UB-P7Z3] (last updated Jan. 15, 2004). 
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indicates that developing space’s “military systems” and “arms-
limitation inspection and control systems” would contribute to 
national security. 28   Among other things, the Wiesner Report 
recommends the military establish “a single responsibility” to take 
charge of the space program’s military component. 29   In other 
words, even back then, America needed a Space Force.30 
However, a new space weaponization race may ignite if the laws 
that currently forbid it are circumvented. 31   To move forward 
without sparking such a race, the Space Force should carefully 
examine international space law, which exists through five United 
Nations (U.N.) outer space treaties from the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).32  Inherent in these five 
treaties33 is the belief that humankind shares space and must travel 
 
 28 Wiesner Committee, supra note 27. 
 29 Wiesner Committee, supra note 27. 
 30  See generally Wiesner Committee, supra note 27.  The Wiesner Report 
postulates: 
If the responsibility of all military space developments were to be assigned 
to one agency or military service within the Department o[f] Defense, the 
Secretary of Defense would then be able to maintain control of the scope 
and direction of the program and the Space Council would have the 
responsibility for settling conflicts of interest between NASA and the 
Department of Defense. 
Wiesner Committee, supra note 27. 
 31 ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 268–69 (noting that “it would be reckless for the 
law to proceed in a manner that allows” weaponizing space).  In a faraway fictional 
galaxy, the severe consequences of a lack of space law principles gives rise to the 
weaponization of space.  See, e.g., Vader Arrives on the Death Star, STAR WARS, 
https://www.starwars.com/video/vader-arrives-on-the-death-star 
[https://perma.cc/L6GJ-ZJW4] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). 
 32 Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFS., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5FB-2TUU] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).  These treaties are: (1) 
the “Outer Space Treaty”; (2) the “Rescue Agreement”; (3) the “Liability 
Convention”; (4) the “Registration Convention”; and (5) the “Moon Agreement.”  
Id.  The United States is a State Party to the first four agreements, but not to the 
“Moon Agreement.”  See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of 
International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2019, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 (2019) [hereinafter Status of International 
Agreements], 
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_20
19_CRP03E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4TC-Y9XZ].  Out of scope for this Comment 
are the “Liability Convention,” the “Registration Convention,” and the “Moon 
Agreement.” 
 33 A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
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there in peace.34  Because the U.N. and the COPUOS will likely stay 
steadfast to “their very primal duties to maintain global peace,” 
instead of giving rise to outer space’s militarization,35 it is essential 
to understand the current landscape of space law.  More 
importantly, American military and civilian lawyers will need to 
“critically analyze international law proposals and aggressively 
proffer alternative views” to counteract other States’ attempts “to 
interpret existing international law in such a way as to limit 
American freedom of action in outer space.”36  
a. Outer Space Treaty (OST) 
To capture the composition of space law, refer to this quote from 
J.R.R. Tolkien: 
One [Treaty] to rule them all, 
One [Treaty] to find them, 
One [Treaty] to bring them all 
and in the darkness [of space] bind them.37 
The first place to look is the Outer Space Treaty (OST), which is 
akin to space law’s Magna Carta.38  On January 27, 1967, the OST 
“was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow” and on October 
 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation . . . .”  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 34  See generally G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Jan. 27, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty], 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspace
treaty.html [https://perma.cc/4S7U-A2BX]. 
 35 ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 267–68. 
 36 John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L. REV. 
107, 117 (2010).  See also RICHARD K. GARDINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 (2003) 
(emphasis in original) (“International law applies between states. . . . These areas are 
the communal parts of water (principally, the sea), and of the air, and the whole of 
outer space.”). 
 37  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, The Fellowship of the Ring, in THE LORD OF THE RINGS 50 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2004). 
 38 Bellflower, supra note 36, at 121.  Tolkien would likely find the OST to be 
the One Treaty to rule over the remaining four U.N. outer space treaties. 
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10, 1967 “entered into force” of law,39 becoming a “supreme law” 
under Article VI of the Constitution.40  As of January 1, 2019, the 
United States and another 108 States are parties to the OST, and an 
additional twenty-three States are signatories awaiting ratification.41  
Moreover, due to its widespread acceptance, the OST applies to all 
States—even nonparties to the treaty—because it “has risen to the 
level of customary international law . . . .” 42   Yet even with 
successful application of the OST, there is a trend towards the 
international community’s desire to restrain the United States’ 
“freedom of action in outer space.”43 
In reality, although there is a shared aspiration to cooperate in 
space and a hypothetical forceful aggression would be condemned, 
“all spacefaring states today have military missions, goals, and 
contingency space-operations plans.”44  In this climate, the United 
States must navigate under the OST because it mandates that space 
use and exploration are bound by “international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining 
 
 39 Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“By the terms of the 
treaty, the United States has agreed to be internationally liable for its space objects 
and retain jurisdiction over its own objects and persons.”), abrogated by Smith v. 
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993). 
 40 U.S. CONST. art. VI (acknowledging that “all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land”). 
 41 Status of International Agreements, supra note 32. 
 42 KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 61.  See also Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ustomary international 
law includes only ‘those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship 
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those 
states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.’” (quoting IIT v. Vencap, 
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975))), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); WILLIAM H. 
BOOTHBY & WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, THE LAW OF WAR: A DETAILED 
ASSESSMENT OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 3 (2018) 
(reminding “that it is the general practice of States supported by opinio juris, not the 
practice of an individual State, that must be demonstrated to establish a customary 
law rule”). 
 43 Bellflower, supra note 36, at 117. 
 44 Bellflower, supra note 36, at 108 (quoting EVERETT C. DOLMAN, ASTROPOLITIK: 
CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE SPACE AGE 2 (2002)). 
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international peace and security . . . .”45  Thus, international law applies 
similarly here on earth as in space.46 
Additionally, under the principle of res communes,47 exclusive 
ownership of space is disallowed under the OST because “[o]uter 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use 
or occupation, or by any other means.”48  Space must be shared by 
all.49  For example, when eight nations in 1976 attempted to expand 
their sovereignty into their respective geostationary orbit under the 
Bogotá Declaration, Article II of the OST estopped them. 50   The 
United States must not appear territorial, as if pursuing Manifest 
Destiny in outer space, and instead balance its interests with those 
of the rest of the world.  But even “in the sovereign-less reaches of 
outer space, each state party to the treaty will retain jurisdiction over 
its own objects and persons.”51 
Under Article VI, the OST requires that States ensure their 
“national activities in outer space,” including those “carried on by 
governmental agencies” such as the Space Force, comply with the 
treaty. 52   The OST, in Article VII, ensures that States receive 
international liability “for damage to another State Party to the 
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its 
component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the 
 
 45 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. III (emphasis added).  Article III of 
the OST may incorporate the prohibition against nations’ threats of using force to 
hinder “the territorial integrity or political independence” of other nations under 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.  See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 205. 
 46 International law includes the Law of War and the Law of the Sea, which 
this Comment discusses in Parts III and IV, respectively. 
 47 KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62.  See Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 34, at art. II.  Res communes is defined as “things owned by no one and 
subject to use by all: things (as light, air, the sea, running water) incapable of entire 
exclusive appropriation.”  Res Communes, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20communes 
[https://perma.cc/76U9-LZVF] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
 48 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II. 
 49 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II. 
 50 All nations receive sovereignty within their airspace.  See KLEIMAN, LAMIE 
& CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62. 
 51 Beattie, 756 F.2d at 100. 
 52  This provision also applies to “non-governmental entities,” which are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VI. 
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moon and other celestial bodies.”53  This provision would apply to 
the Space Force, if: (1) the United States “launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space,” and that “object” or 
“component part” was used to the detriment of another “State 
Party . . . or to its natural or juridical persons[,]” or (2) the United 
States was the “territory or facility [from which] an object is 
launched,” and created such damage.54 
In addition to the potential liability the United States may face 
under the OST should Space Force activity appear bellicose, Article 
IV provides an effective framework of what it—as a State Party—
and its Space Force may or may not do expressly.  Please refer to 
Table 1 below.55 
 
 
Table 1: Acceptable Versus Unacceptable Activities Under the OST 
 
States Parties to the Treaty 
may: 
States Parties to the Treaty may 
not: 
 On the moon and other 
celestial bodies: 
o Use exclusively for 
peaceful purposes 
o Use required 
facility or 
equipment for 
 “[P]lace in orbit56 around 
the Earth any objects 
carrying nuclear weapons 
or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass 
destruction [(“WMDs”)] . . . 
or station such weapons in 
 
 53 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VII; see also G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Nov. 
29, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (stating 
that “a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or the aircraft, and liable for 
damage due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for 
the settlement of claims for damages”).  Under the Liability Convention, this 
liability is joint and several.  See Liability Convention, supra.  The United States is a 
State Party to the Liability Convention.  See Status of International Agreements, 
supra note 32.  This Comment will not examine the Liability Convention in further 
detail. 
 54 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VII. 
 55 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV. 
 56 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF. LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL ¶ 14.10.3.1 (updated Dec. 2016) (quoting Outer Space Treaty art. IV); see 
also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV (elaborating that “[t]he prohibition 
on placing weapons of mass destruction ‘in orbit around the earth’ . . . does not ban 
the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction that go into a fractional 
orbit or engage in suborbital flight.”). 
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peaceful 
exploration 
 Use “military personnel 
for scientific research or for 
any other peaceful 
purposes” 
outer space in any other 
manner.” 
 On celestial bodies: 
o Establish military 
bases, installations, 
and fortifications 
o Test any weapon 
o Install any nuclear 
weapon or WMD 
o Conduct military 
maneuvers 
 
Read in tandem, in addition to what is allowed expressly under 
Article IV (i.e., the chart’s left column), the Space Force is permitted 
impliedly in Earth’s orbit:  (1) to establish a military base, 
installation, or fortification; (2) to test a non-nuclear or non-WMD 
weapon; and (3) to conduct a military maneuver.57  Thus, although 
the Space Force is forbidden to build a military moon-base, it may 
build an earth-orbiting base under Article IV,58 which also legally 
authorizes the military to exercise kinetic and non-kinetic “self-
defense in outer space via non-nuclear weapons and non-weapons of 
mass destruction.”59  Simply put, space law allows for “the passage 
of weapons through space, such as ballistic missiles, the stationing 
of reconnaissance satellites, or the basing of conventional weapons 
in orbit.”60 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD), in paragraph 
14.10.4 of the DoD Law of War Manual, recognizes acceptable military 
activities in space that fall within the “peaceful purposes” 
requirement, including use of satellites for “observation or 
information-gathering” and “lawful military activities in self-
defense (e.g., missile early warning, use of weapon systems) . . . but 
aggressive activities that violate the Charter of the United Nations 
 
 57 See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.3.2 (noting that “[t]hese activities are prohibited only on 
the moon and other celestial bodies, not in outer space itself”). 
 58 See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62. 
 59 Bellflower, supra note 36, at 127 (emphasis added). 
 60 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 195.  See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 
56, ¶ 14.10.3.1 (“In addition, this rule in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty does 
not establish any prohibitions with respect to weapons that are not weapons of 
mass destruction (e.g., anti-satellite laser weapons or other conventional 
weapons).”). 
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would not be permissible.”61  To justify the need for a Space Force, 
the United States shall hold strong to the belief that military 
operations in space are not incongruent with “peaceful purposes” 
and are for its self-defense.62 
b. Rescue Agreement 
A central premise of the OST and its progeny, the Rescue 
Agreement,63 is that space activity is performed by “astronauts” that 
serve as “envoys of all mankind[,]”64 and they should receive States’ 
protection when danger comes their way.65  However, the Space 
Force will likely possess its own brand of astronauts.  Because 
“astronaut” 66  is synonymous with the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), a civilian space agency that focuses 
on “U.S. space exploration and aeronautics research,” 67  this 
 
 61 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.4. 
 62 See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 205; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 
56, ¶ 14.10.4 (“The United States has interpreted use of outer space for ‘peaceful 
purposes’ to mean ‘non-aggressive and beneficial’ purposes consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations and other international law.”). 
 63 G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return 
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (19 Dec. 1967) 
[hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
 64 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. V. 
 65 See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62 (“In the interest of 
promoting international cooperation and collaboration in outer space, the 
international community sought to protect astronauts by requiring States to help 
those in danger. The general principle [under Article V of the OST] was later 
expanded in the Rescue Agreement . . . .”). 
 66  Astronaut Biographies, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/astronauts 
[https://perma.cc/68VS-YVRF] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (asserting that 
“‘astronaut’ derives from the Greek words meaning ‘space sailor,’ and refers to all 
who have been launched as crew members aboard NASA spacecraft bound for orbit 
and beyond”). 
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Comment will use the novel word “astrohoplite”68 to distinguish a 
military Space Force soldier.69 
The Rescue Agreement, expanding on the OST, obligates the 
recovery of a discovered “space object or its component parts,”70 and 
the rescue and return of “personnel of a spacecraft” due “to accident, 
distress, emergency or unintended landing[.]”71   If read broadly, 
“personnel of a spacecraft” would include astrohoplites; however, if 
read narrowly, it would include only astronauts.  So, this is an 
ambiguous term.  The Supreme Court interprets treaties by first 
examining “the text of the treaty and the context in which the written 
words are used.”72  In Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, the Supreme Court 
noted that traditional treaty interpretation tools are applied to an 
ambiguous treaty provision, where the Court “may look beyond the 
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the 
practical construction adopted by the parties.”73 
Nowhere within the Rescue Agreement’s ten articles is the word 
“astronaut.”74  However, in the Preamble that provides the treaty’s 
brief history, the word “astronauts” appears twice when mentioning 
the OST’s significance and the desire “to develop and give further 
concrete expression” to the duties under the OST of “rendering . . . 
all possible assistance to astronauts in the event of accident, distress 
 
 68 This term roughly translates to “space soldier” in Greek.  See astro-, ONLINE 
ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/astro- 
[https://perma.cc/2L89-N63U] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (defining “astro” as “star 
or celestial body; outer space”); hoplite, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=hoplite [https://perma.cc/HEH6-
CELA] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (defining “hoplite” as a “heavy-armed foot 
soldier of ancient Greece”). 
 69 See, e.g., Kevin M. Hymel, First Soldiers in space, U.S. ARMY (Nov. 24, 2009), 
https://www.army.mil/article/30900/first_soldiers_in_space 
[https://perma.cc/W2N5-YWZR] (noting that even after then-Colonel Robert L. 
Stewart “floated through the space shuttle Challenger’s cargo bay and over to his 
jetpack,” he consciously said, “I am not an astronaut, I am a Soldier”). 
 70 Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at art. 5. 
 71 Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at art. 2 (emphasis added). 
 72  Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1508–09 (2017) (quoting 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988)). 
 73 Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. at 1511 (citing Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Under international law, when the United States is a 
State Party to a treaty, its duties are “determined by reference to the normal rules 
of treaty interpretation, taking into account any relevant statements of 
interpretation or reservations that the United States may have submitted, and that 
have not been rejected by the other States party.”  BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON 
HEINEGG, supra note 42, at 3. 
 74 Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at arts. 1–10. 
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or emergency landing, the prompt and safe return of astronauts, and 
the return of objects launched into outer space . . . .” 75  
Unfortunately, the OST does not provide any clarification, as the 
term “astronaut” is not defined within its text either.76 
On the other hand, the practical construction of the Rescue 
Agreement reasonably appears to broaden protections to those 
found in space.  By using the ambiguous phrase “personnel of a 
spacecraft” as opposed to “astronauts,” the Contracting Parties 
allow more parties to fall into the agreement’s shelter.  More 
importantly, the Contracting Parties knew of the term “astronaut” 
and even used it in the Preamble, yet chose to not use it in the Rescue 
Agreement’s articles.77 
Finally, if this ambiguity ever becomes a conflict of laws 
question, the United States applying its definition of “government 
astronaut” may safeguard astrohoplites because § 50902(4) of the 
United States Code, Title 51, provides that a “government 
astronaut”: 
(A) is designated by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration under section 20113(n); 
(B) is carried within a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle in the 
course of his or her employment, which may include 
performance of activities directly relating to the launch, 
reentry, or other operation of the launch vehicle or reentry 
vehicle; and 
(C) is either— 
(i) an employee of the United States Government, 
including the uniformed services, engaged in the 
performance of a Federal function under authority of law 
or an Executive act; or 
(ii) an international partner astronaut.78  
 
 75 Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 76 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34. 
 77 See Rescue Agreement, supra note 63. 
 78 51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2018).  The astrohoplite would need to meet all three 
prongs of this definition, including the first prong that follows section 20113(n): 
For purposes of a license issued or transferred by the Secretary of 
Transportation under chapter 509 [51 U.S.C. § 50901 et seq.] to launch a 
launch vehicle or to reenter a reentry vehicle carrying a government 
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Astrohoplites as members of the “uniformed services, [and] 
engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of 
law or an Executive act” would fall into this definition. 79   The 
astrohoplites that will protect America from a new host of threats 
may not necessarily fall neatly into the parameters of the OST and 
the Rescue Agreement.  Accordingly, the Space Force should apply 
a broader reading of “personnel of a spacecraft” for other States’ 
astrohoplites, so that it may receive reciprocity,80 unless otherwise 
applicable international law applies.  It is important that the United 
States begins to form a concrete view on this issue, as preparations 
are being made81 and the Space Force has already sworn in its first 
member, General John W. “Jay” Raymond, as the inaugural Chief of 
Space Operations.82  In the near future, active duty astrohoplites will 
be performing activities in space because as General Raymond 
stated:  “We no longer have the luxury of operating in a peaceful, 
 
astronaut (as defined in section 50902), the Administration shall designate 
a government astronaut in accordance with requirements prescribed by 
the Administration. 
51 U.S.C. § 20113(n) (2018) (giving NASA discretionary authority to designate a 
“government astronaut”). 
 79 Id.  § 50902(4)(C)(i).  Arguably, all Space Force defensive and peacekeeping 
activities would qualify as “performance of a Federal function under authority of 
law or an Executive act[.]”  Id. 
 80 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (observing that the authority of a 
nation’s laws is limited to the nation’s sovereignty, and “[t]he extent to which the 
law of one nation, . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another 
nation, depends upon . . . ‘the comity of nations’”). 
 81 See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Trump reveals Space Force logo, and ‘Star Trek’ fans 
aren’t happy, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2020, 9:55 AM EST), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/01/25/space-force-
logo/ [https://perma.cc/4M6W-HDPM].  The Space Force has selected an insignia 
which bears some resemblance to that of Star Trek’s Starfleet Command.  Id. 
 82 General John W. “Jay” Raymond, U.S. AIR FORCE, https://www.af.mil/About-
Us/Biographies/Display/Article/108479/general-john-w-jay-raymond/ 
[https://perma.cc/NW2E-KWDL] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (noting Gen. John W. 
‘Jay’ Raymond assumed the duties as the first Chief of Space Operations, United 
States Space Force, Dec. 20, 2019); see David Welna, Commander Sworn in As First 
Member Of New Space Force, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:12 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/796405754/commander-sworn-in-as-first-
member-of-new-space-force [https://perma.cc/24QM-UPKB] (“The first newly 
created branch of the U.S. armed forces in more than seven decades now has its first 
official member.”).  As of April 27, 2020, there are six members in the Space Force.  
See Katherine Hafner, ‘It Feels Awesome’—Meet the newly-graduated Air Force cadet 
who just became the sixth member of Space Force, TASK & PURPOSE (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/how-many-people-are-in-space-force 
[https://perma.cc/YAK2-ZJ67]. 
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benign domain, and we no longer have the luxury of treating space 
superiority as a given.”83 
III. SPACEWALK THE LINE:  THE LAW OF WAR AND RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARENA OF OUTER SPACE 
On April 23, 1910, President Theodore Roosevelt at the Sorbonne 
in Paris delivered his legendary “The Man in the Arena” speech, 
noting that 
[t]here are well-meaning philosophers 84  who declaim 
against the unrighteousness of war . . . . War is a dreadful 
thing, and unjust war is a crime against humanity.  But it is such 
a crime because it is unjust, not because it is a war . . . . Every 
honorable effort should always be made to avoid war . . . but 
no self-respecting individual, no self-respecting nation, can 
or ought to submit to wrong.85 
 
 83 Welna, supra note 82.  In May 2020, Netflix streamed an original show 
sharing the same namesake as the military branch.  See Mike Murphy, These are the 




 84 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. I at xvii (B. Jowett trans., 
Clarendon Press 1885), https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/jowett-the-politics-vol-
1#preview [https://perma.cc/6PPE-KV7J] (“Others again appeal to custom, which 
they identify with justice; but this is a view which cannot be consistently 
maintained. For a war which is justified by custom may nevertheless be an unjust 
war[.]”). 
 85 Theodore Roosevelt, President, United States of America, The Man in the 
Arena, THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR. AT DICKENSON STATE UNIV. (emphasis added), 
https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-
Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ADS3-K8BK] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).  President Roosevelt in 
the same speech noted that 
[i]t is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong 
man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. 
The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena . . . who at the 
best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the 
worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall 
never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor 
defeat. 
Id. (emphasis added).  With proper guidance, the Space Force may achieve victory 
and credit for being in the arena of space. 
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Just war principles continue to inform the United States and the 
rest of the world in their decision-making on military matters. 86  
Because current international treaties do not “expressly address[] 
space jus in bello rules, aside from the Outer Space Treaty’s WMD 
ban,” the Space Force may look to applicable international laws—
such as the law of war87—that “regulate the conduct of hostilities, 
regardless of where they are conducted, which would include the 
conduct of hostilities in outer space.”88 
a. Law of War 
The law of war regulates a nation’s decision to use armed forces.  
It is “firmly established” in treaties and customary international 
laws, and such, applies to the United States.89  Moreover, the United 
States holds the duty to act according to “both the law of initiating 
 
 86 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.6.4.  Just war doctrine includes 
“stringent limitations on the initial resort to war, jus ad bellum, and by seeking 
humane limitations on the means by which war [is] waged, jus in bello.”  GARY D. 
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 19 
(2nd ed. 2010). 
 87 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Since the OST and the four other space law treaties are silent as to what 
happens during war, “the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was trumped 
by the principle of noninterference with space systems . . . None of [the four space 
treaties] has any specific provision that indicates whether the parties intended that 
the agreement apply in wartime.”  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.1 n.153 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def., Off. of the Gen. Counsel, An Assessment of International 
Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLL. INT’L LAW STUDIES 459, 494 (2002)).  “Certain provisions of these treaties 
may not be applicable as between belligerents during international armed conflict.”  
Id.  The DoD does not specify which provisions the U.S. may regard as inapplicable 
during an international armed conflict.  BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra 
note 42, at 368. 
 88 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.2 (stating that the law of war 
applies to outer space like “land, sea, air, or cyber domains”). 
 89 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶¶ 1.3, 1.3.2.2.  The DoD uses several 
definitions for the law of war.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.3.1.1. 
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war (jus ad bellum)90 and the law of conducting war (jus in bello).”91  
Knowing what “war” means is critical because it triggers when rules 
related to jus in bello apply.92  One definition for “war” might be “a 
State’s use of force to vindicate its rights (principally, its inherent 
right of self-defense) under international law.”93  
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,94 however, war is justified 
when performed in self-defense to counter another State’s act of 
aggression.95  Finding active self-defense as an exception to Article 
2(4) 96 —a “cornerstone” of the U.N. Charter and the general 
prohibition on war97—“leaves a wide arena for the use of force in 
space.”98  Because the U.N. Charter “is a living instrument” and may 
 
 90  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 99 (2019) (citation omitted); see also id. at 97 (“[U]nder the international law of 
jus ad bellum . . . the doctrine of self-defense may at times be invoked to use force—
based on a necessarily elongated notion of ‘imminence’—against those senior 
operational leaders who present a ‘continuing and imminent threat’ of striking 
against the United States.”).   
 91 Id. at 99 (“Under domestic law, the United States must follow the terms of 
both the Constitution and the various statutory authorizations for, and restrictions 
on, the use of military force.”).  Use of force under jus in bello requires near perfect 
confidence that civilians will not be injured or killed.  Id. at 97. 
 92 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.2. 
 93 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.1.  In fact, “war” is an ambiguous 
term that is defined in various ways by the United States and other States under 
international law.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.2. 
 94  U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”). 
 95  Id.  This Comment will focus on the role of the United States as an 
individual U.N. Member State responding to an armed attack.  Out of scope are 
anticipatory self-defense, collective self-defense, and obligations with respect to the 
U.N. Security Council’s involvement under Article 51. 
 96 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added). 
 97 See CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 
(2018); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 124 (4th ed. 
2018) (noting that Article 51 is a narrow exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter).  Additionally, customary international law forbids the use of force, or 
even the threat of it.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 185 (June 27) (“In the present 
dispute, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction only in respect of the application 
of the customary rules of non-use of force and non-intervention, cannot disregard 
the fact that the Parties are bound by these rules as a matter of treaty law and of 
customary international law.”). 
 98 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 206. 
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be reinterpreted based on States’ shared subsequent agreement and 
practice, additional excepted activities to Article 2(4) may be added 
under an expanding interpretation of Article 51. 99   Maintaining 
flexibility in interpreting Article 51 allows the Space Force to station 
astrohoplites in space to protect the United States and its orbiting 
weapons systems capable of striking targets in, from, and to space.100  
The United States and its astrohoplites must act righteously—and 
know when there is no choice other than to respond in kind, tit for 
tat.101 
As certain terms have been left undefined by the U.N. Charter,102 
disagreements have sprung up.  One such debate is over Article 
2(4)’s use of the word “threat,” which may prohibit either narrowly 
“threats of unlawful force” or, broadly, “threats of possible lawful 
force,” as they may, in turn, harm international security and 
peace.103  Additionally, Article 2(4) provides no clarity on the gravity 
of threat of force versus use of force, but de facto practice reveals 
that States tolerate threats better than use of force, “and the U.N. 
very rarely expresses any condemnation of the former.”104 
On the other hand, with respect to self-defense, all nations 
concur that it “must be necessary and proportionate.”105  In his 2009 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Barack Obama 
restated just war’s twin principles, noting that: 
[O]ver time, as codes of law sought to control violence within 
groups, so did philosophers and clerics and statesmen seek 
to regulate the destructive power of war.  The concept of a 
 
 99 See HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 19. 
 100 See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 199, 206. 
 101 See Radiolab, Tit for Tat, WNYCSTUDIOS (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/segments/104010-one-good-
deed-deserves-another [https://perma.cc/NFL2-37UT]; see also Leon F. Seltzer, The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the “Virtues” of Tit for Tat, PSYCH. TODAY (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-self/201607/the-
prisoner-s-dilemma-and-the-virtues-tit-tat [https://perma.cc/5YTM-N974] (“If, 
reciprocally, your partner cooperates, you continue to cooperate; if they defect, you 
respond in kind by immediately retaliating against them. This formula has, 
ironically, been characterized as ‘conditional niceness,’ since it advocates for a kind 
of provisional golden rule. And it’s a constant winner.”). 
 102 For example, both “threat” and “use of force” are left undefined by the 
U.N. Charter.  HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 26. 
 103 See GRAY, supra note 97, at 36–37 (“There is also a growing debate as to 
what types of activities can amount to ‘use of force’ as opposed to intervention or 
mere law enforcement.”). 
 104 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 30. 
 105 GRAY, supra note 97, at 157. 
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“just war” emerged, suggesting that war is justified only 
when certain conditions were met:  if it is waged as a last 
resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and 
if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.106 
Necessity and proportionality are fact dependent on a case-by-
case basis. 107   Because a reprisal is typically frowned upon as 
unlawful, an act of self-defense “must not be retaliatory or punitive; 
the aim should be to halt and repel an attack.”108  In reality, however, 
there is a gray area between what constitutes self-defense and what 
constitutes a reprisal. 109   In the Space Force, these early 
determinations will likely be made by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Space Policy, as Section 955 of the Act expressly 
provides that the Assistant Secretary’s principal duty will be to 
oversee “policy of the Department of Defense for space 
warfighting.”110  It is necessary and proper for the Space Force to 
begin analyzing the facts and circumstances that provide for self-
defense in outer space, before policy transforms into law.111 
i. Necessity for Use of Force 
First, if the Space Force intends to act in self-defense, it must 
make a good faith showing of necessity, in that there is “no 
alternative response to an armed attack . . . .”112  In other words, the 
Space Force when acting in self-defense must establish either the 
 
 106 Barack H. Obama, 44th President of the U.S., Nobel Lecture: A Just and 
Lasting Peace, (Dec. 10, 2009) (highlighting that adherence to international 
standards for the use of force “becomes particularly important [for accountability] 
when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of 
one nation against an aggressor”). 
 107 GRAY, supra note 97, at 159-60 (“In theory it is possible to draw a distinction 
between necessity and proportionality, and the [International Court of Justice] 
typically applies the two requirements separately.”). 
 108 GRAY, supra note 97, at 159-60. 
 109  GRAY, supra note 97, at 160; see also HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 241 
(“[A]rmed reprisals are acts of forcible self-help, involving an unlawful use of force 
falling short of war, by one state in response to a prior violation of international law 
by another.”) (internal citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted). 
 110 S. 1790, 116th Cong.  § 955(a) (2019) (enacted). 
 111 See KOH, supra note 90, at 18 (observing that “norms initially articulated as 
policy for political reasons affect legal rulings and over time themselves harden into 
law”). 
 112 GRAY, supra note 97, at 159. 
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unavailability of “reasonable non-forcible measures” or the 
“reasonable expectation that recourse to such measures would be 
ineffective.” 113   A helpful fact is knowing whether the “armed 
attack” was an act of terrorism, because if so, the Space Force may 
respond to a ceased attack by invoking self-defense to prevent future 
harm and this response will be received more favorably by the 
international community.114  Pivotal to the necessity analysis is the 
“nature of the armed attack, or threat thereof, in terms of the 
weapons and methods used . . . .”115  There is universal agreement 
that a right to self-defense is invoked by an “armed attack”; 
however, it is unsettled what even constitutes one and how to 
identify it due to “the special characteristics of particular 
weapons.”116  In short, the necessity for self-defense may hinge on 
certain facts, such as whether the perpetrators used or threatened to 
use WMDs, conventional weaponry, or cyberattacks.117 
Another threshold issue is based upon the Space Force’s 
interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which may be read 
more inclusively or exclusively. 118   If reading Article 51 as an 
expansionist, then self-defense equals “a right that nothing in the 
Charter shall impair.” 119   From this viewpoint, this pre-existing 
“inherent” right stems from “earlier customary international law” 
that the U.N. Charter did not expressly strike and that recognized 
“the protection of nationals and anticipatory” self-defense at the 
time of the Charter’s implementation.120  Alternatively, restrictionists 
assert that “if, and only if, an armed attack occurs and imminent 
threats of attack are not covered by Article 51[,]”121 is self-defense 
tolerable as a narrow exception to Article 2(4). 122   Regardless of 
whether one is an expansionist or restrictionist—for a “one-off 
minor incident” or “an ongoing conflict”—central to the States’ 
 
 113 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 230. 
 114 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 231.  For example, the United States’ response 
to the acts of terrorism on 9/11 was “generally well received by other [S]tates.”  
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 232. 
 115 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 233. 
 116 GRAY, supra note 97, at 134–35. 
 117 See HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 233. 
 118 GRAY, supra note 97, at 124. 
 119 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 277–78 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120 GRAY, supra note 97, at 124. 
 121 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 278. 
 122 GRAY, supra note 97, at 124 (noting that for those who share this view, 
“Article 51 is clear; the right . . . arises only if an armed attack (French: aggression 
armée) occurs”). 
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controversy are “the questions of fact as to whether there has 
actually been an armed attack of the type claimed and, if so, which 
state was the victim.”123  
ii. Proportionality for Use of Force 
Second, for self-defense to meet the proportionality 
requirement, “[n]o more force or greater violence should be used to 
carry out a military operation than is necessary in the 
circumstances.”124  Because proportionality is a “constraint on the 
scale and effects of defensive action,”125 factors used to determine it 
are “the size, duration, and target of the response . . . .”126  Although 
there are no underpinnings or guidelines, 127  proportionality is 
referenced by States as the “criterion for a lawful act” to justify their 
acts of self-defense and those of others.128  Proportionality depends 
on the act falling under either jus ad bellum or jus in bello.129  The 
former measures the act in its totality, but “the latter considers the 
force applied as against a specific military target as defined by 
international law at any given point during that operation.”130 
Space offers a sui generis environment for warfare.  As there are 
virtually no people in space—other than those boarded on the 
International Space Station131 and on the occasional Virgin Galactic 
spacecraft132—States may “harm each other without directly costing 
 
 123  GRAY, supra note 97, at 121. 
 124 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 258 (citation omitted). 
 125 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 126 GRAY, supra note 97, at 159 (“[T]hese factors are also relevant to necessity.”). 
 127 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 235. 
 128 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234. 
 129 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234. 
 130 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234 (quoting Dino Kritsiotis, A Study of the 
Scope and Operation of the Rights of Individuals and Collective Self-Defence under 
International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND 
SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM (Nigel D. White & 
Christian Henderson eds., 2013), 170, 211–12 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 131  See Doris Elin Urrutia, Crowded Space Station: There are 9 People from 4 
Different Space Agencies in Orbit Right Now, SPACE.COM (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.space.com/space-station-crowded-nine-crewmembers-expedition-
60.html [https://perma.cc/E5DX-J22N]. 
 132 See Mike Wall, Virgin Galactic’s VSS Unity space plane arrives at New Mexico 
spaceport, SPACE.COM (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.space.com/virgin-galactic-
spaceshiptwo-unity-spaceport-america.html [https://perma.cc/8NKK-4TBP]. 
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the lives of combatants or civilians.  Their use of force will destroy 
satellites that can be replaced and cause only temporary economic 
losses.”133   So long as temporarily disabled communications and 
transportation networks do not cause unintended consequences, no 
one will need to die.134 
The Space Force may deliver a reasonably calculated, temporary, 
and proportional response on another nation’s “space-based 
systems . . . without causing the death and destruction of terrestrial 
combat.”135   If the satellites, even though civilian-based, support 
military functions, the Space Force may target them “under 
traditional approaches to the laws of war.  Military use of civilian 
systems renders them liable to attack during armed conflict.” 136  
Moreover, it is fair game for the Space Force to disable any military-
purchased “surveillance or communications bandwidth from 
civilian providers[.]” 137   Another proposed self-defense tactic in 
space may be aiming “ground-based lasers to temporarily blind 
satellites or jam their connections with ground control stations.”138  
This is in the realm of possibility for a proportionate response, as the 
Space Force would produce a “loss” without the “death and 
destruction of kinetic weapons.”139  This kind of warfare would be 
similar to a game of keep away, in that the Space Force’s goal would 
not be to destroy or create permanent damage to another State’s 
resources or satellite systems, but merely frustrate the opponent for 
a period of time until it acquiesces.140 
 
 133 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 221 (noting that loss of GPS signal or 
slowed down Internet data may occur, “[b]ut no one dies, no infrastructure is 
destroyed, and no lands or waters ruined”). 
 134 See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 221. 
 135 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220. 
 136 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218.  If a nation possesses no military 
satellite systems, then attacking its “civilian space systems” is acceptable as the least 
“destructive means of coercion.  Disabling the space-based elements of a 
communication system could pressure an opponent without causing any human 
casualties, much in the same way as shutting down its Internet or financial 
markets.”  RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219. 
 137 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218. 
 138 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219. 
 139 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219. 
 140 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219. 
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b. Responding Tit for Tat—Self-Defense Matrices 
Over the next decade, “constellations” of 800 to 1,000 “small and 
miniaturized satellites both for imaging and communications” will 
launch every year.141  As satellites become an even more essential 
part of nations’ infrastructures,142 it is not a stretch to see how they 
may be attacked to antagonize a State—especially when 
communication services are “in higher demand as much of the 
world spends more time at home due to the coronavirus 
pandemic[.]”143  The United States, China, and Russia already have 
earth-to-space “anti-satellite missiles,” and in the future, nations 
will possess maneuverable satellites that may collide with another 
State’s satellite system, simultaneously destroying it and creating 
debris fields.144 
Tables 2a and 2b provide hypothetical uses of force by Hostile 
State against the United States, and how the Space Force may 





 141 K.R. Sridhara Murthi & V. Gopalakrishnan, Trends in Outer Space Activities 
– Legal and Policy Challenges, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 27, 31–32 
(2017). 
 142 Id. at 30–31 (“More than fifty nations operate satellites in space, while over 
100 nations are engaged in the use of space systems and services.”). 
 143 Eric Mack, Elon Musk says Starlink satellite broadband to start beta testing this 
year, CNET (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:16 PM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/elon-musk-
says-starlink-satellite-broadband-beta-testing-to-start-soon/ 
[https://perma.cc/6A8F-PEP7] (noting that SpaceX’s international filings indicate 
plans to grow its Starlink constellation to more than 40,000 satellites for more 
affordable internet access worldwide). 
 144 Dale Stephens, Increasing Militarization of Space and Normative Responses, in 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 93 (2017). 
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Space Force’s Self-Defense Nec. Prop. 
JUS AD BELLUM 
Shoots down 
500 satellites in 
constellation 
Yes145 
Shoots down ≤ 500 satellites 




Shoots down 1,000 satellites 








Electronically jams148 Hostile 
State’s similarly sized 
constellation / damages same 
number of satellites’ optic 
sensors 
Likely Yes Yes 
Shoots down satellites in 








Notify Hostile State of 
damage done to constellation Yes Yes 
Electronically jams Hostile 
State’s similarly sized 
constellation / damages same 




Table 2b:  Self-Defense Matrix–Jus in Bello 
 
 145 Id. at 97 (“In the context of space activities, an Article 2(4) violation may be 
manifested where activities are initiated by a State in space or on earth that causes 
physical damage on target state’s terrestrial space-based infrastructure.”). 
 146  Id. at 98 (“[A State’s] parallel neutralization of blocking satellites, the 
reciprocal ‘bumping’ and/or cyber reaction that disables a violating satellite . . . or 
other space object may arguably be lawful reactions depending on the 
circumstances, and the interests that are imperilled.”). 
 147 Id. at 97 (noting that “use of lasers to damage optic sensors of passing 
satellites or otherwise ‘bumping’ or otherwise physically damaging satellites” are 
additional Article 2(4) violations). 
 148  Dan Robitzski, Space Force Unveils Its First Weapon, A Satellite Jammer, 
FUTURISM (Apr. 23, 2020), https://futurism.com/the-byte/space-force-first-
weapon-satellite-jammer [https://perma.cc/XMU9-LE58] (“The U.S. Space Force 
recently acquired its first offensive weaponry: a device capable of blocking satellite 
communications, temporarily rendering orbiting satellites useless.”). 
 149 Stephens, supra note 144, at 98 (observing that a State may not use “kinetic 
force” under these circumstances). 
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Space Force’s Self-Defense Nec. Prop. 





Shoots down Hostile State’s 
unmanned spacecraft Likely Yes Yes 









Shoots down Hostile State’s 





Shoots down Hostile State’s 
manned spacecraft carrying 
prisoners of war, civilians, or 
wounded / attacks a hospital, 
school, or civilian home in 
Hostile State151 
No No 
c. Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are not law—international or 
domestic152—but share an important role in warfare because they 
“are the primary means of regulating the use of force in armed 
conflict . . .  They are akin to a tether, with which senior commanders 
control the use of force by individual combatants.”153  To guide their 
soldiers, nearly all States’ armed forces have a version of the ROE.154  
If ROE were a wooden three-legged stool, then the three legs would 
be “national policy, operational requirements and law.” 155   The 
stool’s seat on top would be the foundational law of war and other 
 
 150 Stephens, supra note 144, at 98 (“At present, there is no specific Treaty that 
regulates armed conflict in space.”). 
 151 This anticipates application of law of war principles, which would provide 
protections over these individuals and locations. 
 152 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490 (“[Rules of Engagement] are military directives, 
heavy with acronyms.”). 
 153 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495.  To help the individual commander employ 
their armed forces, the ROE are constructed with “the help of military lawyers and 
implemented by those who execute the military mission.”  SOLIS, supra note 86, at 
495. 
 154 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490. 
 155 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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customary international law, “along with considerations of political 
objectives and the military mission.” 156   ROE may limit a 
commander’s action for certain issues (e.g., grant/denial for a certain 
weapon’s use), but “ROE never limit the right and obligation of 
combatants to exercise self-defense.”157  More similar to a code of 
conduct, ROE do not provide instructions on executing military 
missions because “ROE are not tactical in nature[.]”158 
The Space Force must establish a substantial ROE for 
astrohoplites because they are essential in meeting the standards the 
United States must follow under the law of war “on the modern 
battlefield”159—and ROE “are frequently cited when . . . violations 
are alleged.”160  The Space Force should continue the tradition of any 
astrohoplite’s misconduct under ROE to be “prosecuted as 
violations of a lawful general order, a common Uniform Code of 
Military Justice offense.”161   In a Congressional hearing, General 
Creighton Abrams, Jr.162 declared, “The rules [of engagement] have 
been forever . . . a source of frustration to many commanders.  And 
they have had to live with them.  And they have had to do their job 
with them.”163 
In 1994, the military “redesignated” ROE as the Standing Rules 
of Engagement (“SROE”), which underwent a January 2000 revision 
“to give individual self-defense increased emphasis.”164  Following 
current standards, the astrohoplite may use “self-defense, as long as 
 
 156 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495. 
 157 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495 (emphasis in original) (“[The ROE] may [not] 
authorize a violation of LOAC/IHL . . . .”). 
 158 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495. 
 159 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 491. 
 160 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490. 
 161 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490 (citation omitted). 
 162  General Abrams was a four-star general who was “head of Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, which oversaw all American combat 
forces inside South Vietnam.”  Brig. Gen. John D. Howard (ret.), This general 




 163 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 493 (quoting LEWIS SORLEY, THUNDERBOLT: GENERAL 
CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ARMY OF HIS TIMES 341 (1998)). 
 164 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494.  See also SOLIS, supra note 86, at 502 (“All ROE 
contain a clear statement of the right to self-defense.  Occasionally, ROE also 
describe escalation-of-force measures.  Most contain other common elements 
addressing enemy hostile acts, enemy hostile intent, dealing with enemy forces 
declared hostile, and a positive identification requirement.”).  
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the opposing force remains a threat, it may be pursued and 
engaged.”165  Under an objective standard for self-defense, “a soldier 
is not necessarily required to employ each option before escalating 
to the next higher force level, and when circumstances dictate, the 
soldier may go immediately to deadly force.”166 
In June 2005, SROE added Standing Rules for the Use of Force 
(“SRUF”),167 which “apply in domestic civil support missions and 
land defense missions within U.S. territory.”168  The legal source 
behind SROE are “generally shaped by international legal 
obligations, such as the United Nations Charter, international 
treaties, and customary international law[,]” whereas the SRUF “are 
generally shared by domestic or host-nation legal obligations.”169  In 
a future update of the SROE and SRUF, the Space Force’s 
astrohoplites should be considered170 because the majority of space 
will stay shared international territory; however, within the confines 
of the Space Forces’ bases and ships are potentially United States 
space (or waters).171 
 
 165 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 502 (“Unless the ROE specify otherwise, there is no 
requirement that a self-defense engagement be terminated when the opposing force 
attempts to break off contact.”). 
 166 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 505 (“ROE are interpreted in a reasonable way.”). 
 167 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494. 
 168 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494. 
 169 SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.2 (“[L]aw of war 
treaties[,] the customary law of war[, the SROE, and the SRUF] are understood to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities, regardless of where they are conducted, which 
would include the conduct of hostilities in outer space.”). 
 171 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1. (“Outer space may be viewed 
as analogous to the high seas in certain respects.  For example, no State may claim 
sovereignty over outer space.”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra 
note 56, ¶ 14.10.1, n.145.  Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, 63 (Mar. 13, 1967) (“[O]nce we 
leave airspace, and get to outer space, however you define the limits, this is an 
attempt to create in outer space the closest analogy and that is the high seas.”); 
Outer Space Treaty art. VIII: 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer 
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and 
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.  
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed 
or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not 
affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their 
return to the Earth.  Such objects or component parts found beyond the 
limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried 
shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return. 
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IV. FINDING OPEN SPACE UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA 
With a Space Force, the vastest ocean yet is next.  From the 
moment a United States Navy was created, “military use of the 
oceans has been associated with the seas . . . .”172  The high seas are 
often used as “the most common analogy for space” when looking 
at implications on commerce and military expansion because “[i]f 
similar to the high seas, space would allow any nation to deploy 
both military and civilian craft free from interference.”173  Unlike 
outer space, the law over how the military uses waterways is quite 
developed during times of war and peace.174  For war time, “Hague 
law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Protocols have 
application, in addition to the distinctive international law that 
applies to the sea during these times, including the laws of naval 
warfare.”175  For peacetime, the third United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS III”) sheds some light.176  The law of 
the sea is a proven testing ground for “international law’s ability to 
facilitate coexistence and interaction between states, and also 
between their national systems of law.”177 
 
 172 DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
259 (2010) (“[E]arly uses of the oceans were for the purpose of asserting naval power 
with the objective of controlling the oceans.”). 
 173 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216. 
 174 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (“[T]he linkages and tensions 
between the law [of the sea] and naval operations became more prominent as the 
law consolidated and was codified throughout the twentieth century.”).  The OST 
and the other space treaties only considered “peaceful purposes.”  See, e.g., Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV (“The moon and other celestial bodies shall be 
used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.”). 
 175 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (emphasis added and internal 
citations omitted).  These wartime laws are out of scope for this Comment because 
the current state of space is more closely related to the peacetime Law of the Sea.  
“Two dimensions of general international law have particular relevance to military 
operations at sea: the law of naval warfare, and UN-sanctioned naval operations.”  
Id. at 260.  Unfortunately, there are no corollaries on point for space law. 
 176 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (noting that UNCLOS III was 
“designed to bring security to the oceans, and with it an enhancement of the 
peaceful uses of the oceans through maritime confidence building”); United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS III]. 
 177 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1188 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:4 
a. Law of the Sea 
As an initial matter, the law of the sea—comprised of treaties 
(e.g., UNCLOS III) and customary international law—“developed 
principally with peacetime situations in mind.  Nothing in the law 
of the sea impairs a State’s inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense, or rights during armed conflict.”178  More specifically, 
the Preamble of UNCLOS III recognizes an aspiration to establish “a 
legal order for the seas and oceans which . . . will promote the 
peaceful use of the seas and oceans . . . .”179  Additionally, Article 301 
provides that “States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international 
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”180 
Renowned as the “constitution” for oceans, UNCLOS III 
specifies in detail “practically every aspect of the use and resources 
of the seas and the oceans.”181  As of March 8, 2020, there are 157 
signatories and 168 parties to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea; however, the United States remains a nonparty.182  
Although President Ronald Reagan, on behalf of “the United States 
famously declined to ratify the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, [he] recognized much of it as governing U.S. practice and 
eventually as customary international law.”183 
 
 178 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1. 
 179 UNCLOS III, supra note 176, pmbl. 
 180 UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 301 (emphasis added).  This reads like 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 
 181 JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA 48 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 182 See Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION: STATUS OF TREATIES, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI
-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/M8B7-69YD] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2021); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., What is the law of the 
sea?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lawofsea.html  
[https://perma.cc/4E99-XTJU] (last updated Feb. 26, 2021) (“While the United 
States ratified the 1958 Convention, as of late 2013, it had not become a party to the 
1982 Convention.  The United States recognizes that the 1982 Convention reflects 
customary international law and complies with its provisions.”). 
 183 KOH, supra note 90, at 18; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2 
(observing that the United States did not sign UNCLOS III in 1982 because of the 
deep seabed mining provisions, “[h]owever, in 1983, the United States announced 
that it was prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests . . . 
relating to traditional uses of the oceans”). 
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Notably, general international law tends to supersede the law of 
the sea on the question of use of force and its related limitations.184  
Because “the modern law of the sea” was drafted without 
prioritizing wartime military operations, its effect is on “military 
operations at sea during peacetime, particularly the movement of 
naval vessels through the territorial sea, international straits, and 
archipelagic waters of foreign states.” 185   Any State’s military 
operations or act of self-defense that are “consistent with 
international law,” is unaffected by “the use of the high seas for 
peaceful purposes . . . .” 186   However, these obligations to other 
States may become malleable during wartime, based on the 
military’s needs and consideration of the law of war.187 
i. Sovereignty Over Waters 
In 1983, the United States agreed to abide by the same 
“traditional uses of the oceans” as those under UNCLOS III for 
“navigation and overflight rights and freedoms . . . .”188  Waters are 
subjected to either a State’s sovereignty (national waters) or not 
(international waters). 189   National waters may include “internal 
waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters.”190  On the other 
hand, international waters “include contiguous zones, exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs), and the high seas.”191  A State’s freedom in 
the high seas provides for warships to exercise “task force 
maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, surveillance, 
intelligence gathering activities, and ordnance testing and firing.”192 
 
 184 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 260 (noting that Article 301 of 
the UNCLOS defers to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, prohibiting any use of force 
contrary to the Charter). 
 185 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 260.  See also id. at 266 (stating 
that the law of the sea acknowledges that the “high seas are reserved for peaceful 
purposes”). 
 186  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1 (identifying the similar 
interpretation of “peaceful purposes” in “use of outer space”). 
 187  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1. 
 188  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2. 
 189  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2. 
 190  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2. 
 191  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.3. 
 192  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.3.1 (observing that exercising these 
rights must be balanced with “the interests of other States”). 
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As the high seas make up the majority of the earth’s waters and 
are not “subject to the sovereignty of any one state,” a State may take 
claim to “only a narrow margin around” its sovereign coastline.193  
The United States claims a territorial sea194 of twelve nautical miles, 
and “a contiguous zone extending [twenty-four] nautical miles” that 
follows international law and does not intersect another State’s 
territorial seas,195 up to twelve nautical miles.196  Also, archipelagic 
States (e.g., Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines) claim sovereignty 
over “waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines drawn in 
accordance with” UNCLOS III.197 
ii. Innocent Passage 
Innocent passage is a right that allows foreign vessels to navigate 
in and through another State’s territorial sea and archipelagic waters 
without fear of harassment.198  In times of peace, all ships possess 
this right, but innocent passage does not apply to a belligerent 
State’s ship in times of armed conflict.199  Additionally, belligerent 
States may establish a maritime zone during an armed conflict that 
limits neutral vessels’ ability to navigate their territorial seas and 
archipelagic waters.  Meanwhile, “neutral States may regulate, and 
even prohibit, belligerent warships and prizes from entering their 
territorial seas and archipelagic waters.”200 
Article 19 of UNCLOS III defines what is and is not innocent 
passage accordingly: 
1.  Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.  Such 
 
 193 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. 
 194 Territorial seas are adjacent to a State’s coastline.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra 
note 56, ¶ 13.2.2. 
 195  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2. 
 196  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.2. 
 197  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.3.  Archipelagic States are 
composed in whole or in part by at least one archipelago, which is a cluster of 
“islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting water, and other natural 
features that are so closely interrelated that they form an intrinsic geographic, 
economic, and political entity or that historically have been regarded as such.”  Id. 
 198 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 76; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra 
note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4. 
 199  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4. 
 200  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4. 
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passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention 
and with other rules of international law. 
2.  Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following 
activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the 
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the 
prejudice of the defen[s]e or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the 
defen[s]e or security of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency 
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wil[l]ful and serious pollution contrary to 
this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of 
communication or any other facilities or installations of 
the coastal State; 
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage.201 
 
 201 UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19. 
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In sum, the express prohibitions under Article 19(2) include a 
mixture of military and economic activities.202 
b. Applying the Law of the Sea to Outer Space:  Two Ships in the Night 
Currently, space law does not provide a corollary to the concept 
of innocent passage, 203  as no State in outer space may claim 
sovereignty,204 which is an inherent feature of territorial seas and 
archipelagic waters.  Within paragraph 14.10.1 of the DoD Law of War 
Manual, the military classifies outer space as being both legally 
distinct from airspace and “analogous to the high seas in certain 
respects.”205  Similarities to the high seas include the proposition 
that “space systems of all nations have rights of passage through 
space without interference.”206 
But it does not take much imagination to see why States should 
desire the same right of innocent passage there because “they could 
engage in military patrols and use space resources for their own 
benefit.  Popular culture exemplified this way of thinking.  Star Trek 
named its ship the USS Enterprise, made its commander a Captain, 
and placed it under the command of a Starfleet.”207  Already, States 
perform data collection on each other in space, “providing an 
information conduit for enhanced military operations.  Space also 
provides an environment for widespread commercial activity, from 
television transmissions to GPS location services.”208  After all, it 
only may take a single misunderstanding to spark an international 
crisis among the stars. 
 
 202 See UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19(2). 
 203 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, 
INT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SPACE SAFETY 13 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2017/tech-05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GQ3D-BUM8] (proposing that either an amendment to a 
current treaty or new treaty altogether could establish innocent passage for all “like 
the High Seas, open to peaceful use”). 
 204 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II. 
 205  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1. 
 206  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1 (citing Outer Space Treaty, at 
art. I). 
 207 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216. 
 208 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216. 
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For example, two spaceships—the USS Enterprise 209  and the 
Millennium Falcon210—passing in the night at warp speed211 will 
need to avoid any potential collisions.  Do they follow the same 
protocols as if at sea212 and pass by each other safely, or because of 
an absence of rules simply hope and pray that they do not crash?  
Under Rule 14 of the Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGs”), these two spaceships 
“meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses” may avoid a 
head-on collision by altering their “course to starboard so that each 
shall pass on the port side of the other.”213 
Moreover, within the confines of both the USS Enterprise and 
Millennium Falcon are likely sovereign territories.  When at sea, 
“[s]hips have for centuries had a formal link with a state, signified 
by flying that state’s flag.  Thus even vessels in private ownership 
are ‘instrumentalities’ that have the flag state’s nationality.”214  Here, 
the USS Enterprise would be sovereign territory of the United States 
as it wears that flag, and the Millennium Falcon is privately owned, 
so it would be an instrumentality for the appropriate jurisdiction.215  
If spaceships are given a flag State’s nationality, then one would be 
able to discern “which law can apply on board and which [S]tate can 
 
 209  Enterprise, STAR TREK, 
https://www.startrek.com/database_article/enterprise [https://perma.cc/2RBS-
TQAP] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (“The ship arguably gained its status as the most 
famous space-exploration vessel in history due to its historic five-year mission from 
2264-2269.”). 
 210  Millennium Falcon, STAR WARS, 
https://www.starwars.com/databank/millennium-falcon 
[https://perma.cc/JG82-YAJR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (“An extensively 
modified Corellian light freighter, the Millennium Falcon is a legend in smuggler 
circles and is coveted by many for being the fastest hunk of junk in the galaxy.”). 
 211 This hypothetical requires some suspension in belief that: (1) spaceships 
can travel at warp speed; (2) accident-avoidance technology exists for spaceships 
traveling at warp speed; (3) Starfleet descends from the United States Space Force; 
and (4) the USS Enterprise and the Millennium Falcon could be in the same universe 
and timeline. 
 212  United Nations Convention on the International Regulations for 




 213 Id. at Rule 14(a). 
 214 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. 
 215 Millennium Falcon, supra note 210 (noting that there have been a “succession 
of owners,” so research will be required to determine the sovereign jurisdiction). 
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assert a right of protection, that is, to assert rights under 
international law in respect of the instrumentality.”216 
Additionally, a State’s fleet of spaceships may be akin to an 
archipelago, deserving of a territorial sea of outer space.  Would the 
Millennium Falcon receive innocent passage if traveling between the 
USS Enterprise and other Starfleet spaceships—the archipelago—
when planning to violate Article 19(2)(g) of UNCLOS III by “loading 
or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations”217 of 
the United States?  Under these facts, the Millennium Falcon will not 
receive innocent passage under UNCLOS III because “while vessels 
on the high seas are, in principle, subject to exclusive jurisdiction of 
their flag states, enforcement action is possible on the high seas in 
exceptional circumstances, for example when a ship is engaged in 
piracy . . . .”218  Moreover, international law provides no safe harbor 
for pirates (even space pirates) because they are the “common 
enemies of all mankind.”219 
Finally, if the Millennium Falcon did not fly under a state flag as 
a pirate spaceship, then “on the high seas and in foreign ports, 
particular circumstances, such as a collision, illegal use of the vessel 
or exploitation of the sea’s resources, may lead to a [S]tate other than 
the flag [S]tate having an interest in the application of law on or to a 
ship.”220  On the other hand, the USS Enterprise and other Starfleet 
spaceships, if considered “warships” at sea, would hold “complete 
immunity on the high seas” of space because they would “not 
generally [be] engaged in police functions.”221  Warships’ “activities 
are part of a sovereign [S]tate’s armed capabilities.  Their use of the 
seas, for example for naval exercises, is subject to general 
international law of responsibility.  This includes the duty of [S]tates 
to warn of any hazard . . . .”222  The USS Enterprise and other Starfleet 
spaceships may stop the Millennium Falcon because “pirates should 
 
 216 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. 
 217 UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19. 
 218 HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 71. 
 219 RUWANTISSA I.R. ABEYRATNE, FRONTIERS OF AEROSPACE LAW 108 (2002).  The 
definition of a pirate is quite the opposite of an astronaut. 
 220 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.  Also, “[i]f the ship enters the territorial 
waters of another state, or those internal to that state, legislative jurisdiction 
concurrent with that of the flag may arise; and, because of the ‘territorial’ position 
of the ship, the coastal or post state has exclusive enforcement jurisdiction.”  
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. 
 221 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 416. 
 222 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 416. 
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be lawfully captured on the high seas by an armed vessel of any 
particular [S]tate, and brought within its territorial jurisdiction for 
trial and punishment.”223 
V. SHAPING THE FUTURE OF SPACE WARFARE 
In 1988, the United States was the only dissenting nation when 
the U.N. General Assembly “passed a resolution calling for general 
and complete disarmament under effective international control so 
that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
not become an arena for an arms race.”224  On the other hand, in his 
2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Barack Obama 
acknowledged that not even “America—in fact, no nation—can 
insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow 
them ourselves.  For when we don’t, our actions appear arbitrary 
and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how 
justified.”225  The DoD recognizes that the OST “imposes restrictions 
on certain military operations in outer space (i.e., it does not exempt 
military spacecraft or military space activities from its purview).”226  
Although it appears that in recent days, the United States has not 
provided legal justifications for every military action, the Space 
Force should “take care to offer a legal argument for [its] use of 
force.”227 
The United States and its President remain “powerful players in 
the making and unmaking of international law.”228  So, it is in the 
best interest of the Space Force that the President brings forth a 
 
 223 ABEYRATNE, supra note 219, at 108. 
 224 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 208 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  The vote was 154 to 1.  RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 208. 
 225  Obama, supra note 106 (stating further that “this becomes particularly 
important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the 
defense of one nation against an aggressor.”). 
 226  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.1.  The DoD Law of War Manual 
mentions that the “collective view of all departments of the US Government is not 
necessarily reflected in its pages, and the reader is therefore somewhat left to 
speculate as to its actual status and claimed authority in international law.”  
BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 42, at 2. 
 227 GRAY, supra note 97, at 30 (“President Trump has not to date set out legal 
justifications for the USA’s 2017 direct intervention in Syria at any length; he seems 
to be relying on doctrines developed by the previous administration to explain his 
escalation of the use of force.”). 
 228 KOH, supra note 90, at 14. 
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“carefully negotiated global diplomatic solution that builds a 
binding legal regime firmly rooted in international law.”229  But, 
even if “international law applies to space,” there is no clear answer 
as to which specific laws “supply the rules that should apply.”230  As 
a global commons, outer space may be compared with “other 
environments” to answer complex legal problems that give rise to 
“important consequences for regulation.  Some, for example, have 
compared space to the discovery of the New World in 1492, opened 
by voyages of discovery and subject to claims of sovereignty.”231  
Generally, factors such as an activity’s “location” or “nature” may 
provide the applicable “regime of international law” for a given 
situation. 232   Space Force attorneys will need to understand the 
effects of characterizing outer space to establish when an activity or 
event is governed by an applicable law.233 
Richard K. Gardiner, in his book International Law, states the 
following: 
International law presents two ways of defining or 
describing the areas under consideration.  First, there are the 
law and procedural mechanisms which determine where the 
boundaries of each area are.  Specific or controversial 
determinations of such boundaries are usually described as 
‘delimitation’, particularly in the context of maritime areas.  
Second, there are the characteristics which identify the 
international regime in each area.  The process of 
delimitation is primarily the active concern of lawyers 
advising states who need to establish boundaries for 
purposes of control, public order and responsibility, as well 
as defen[s]e and exploitation of resources.234 
Delimitation is critical to understanding the use of space, 
because “although space law has been the subject of several treaties, 
these do not define the location of outer space, or more specifically 
its lower boundary.”235  The difficulty is that even using the plain 
meaning of “outer space” as “beyond the atmosphere” remains a bit 
 
 229 KOH, supra note 90, at 80. 
 230 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220. 
 231 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 215. 
 232 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 395. 
 233 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 396. 
 234 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 395-96. 
 235 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 400. 
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hazy, “because the atmosphere becomes progressively thinner 
without a precise line . . . .”236  Accordingly, Space Force attorneys 
will need to tread carefully when drawing from analogies to the law 
of war and law of the sea, and when current space law does not 
provide a clear answer. 
A well-delineated Space Force policy may act as a stopgap, 
before States come together to create treaties or develop customary 
international law on space warfare.  Because the tools of “law and 
policy” have different degrees of staying power for “internaliz[ing] 
international norms[,]”237 the Space Force may use policy to have 
flexibility in effectively troubleshooting military operations for 
peaceful purposes, as required by the OST.  To make legal 
determinations prematurely may hinder the development of space 
warfare by forming fixed points that are difficult to amend once 
adopted. 238   For example, current international law allows for 
orbiting “conventional weapons or new, exotic weapons such as 
high-energy beams,” and for “nuclear warheads” to journey 
“through space on their way to ground targets.”239  But, the future 
of space warfare may allow the Space Force to “escalate a conflict by 
destroying surveillance satellites or by temporarily jamming or 
blinding them with space-based weapons . . . [or even] attack a 
single node in an opponent’s military or government 
telecommunications network, which would not permanently 
destroy the whole network, but would degrade the system’s 
reliability.” 240   As the Space Force will be making real-time 
decisions, on-demand policymaking will likely be the short-term 
solution to make better future law. 
Ultimately, international cooperation will be required to solidify 
“standards that govern the use of force” in space warfare.241  Time 
and again, “disengagement from global governance” has been of 
little help and ineffective 242  because of the “transnational legal 
process.  International law is no longer just for nation-states or 
 
 236 GARDINER, supra note 36, at 401. 
 237 KOH, supra note 90, at 18 (“Executive branch policies usually do not bind 
future administrations as powerfully as do executive branch determinations about 
the applicability of international legal rules.”). 
 238 See KOH, supra note 90, at 18. 
 239 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 217. 
 240 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218. 
 241 Obama, supra note 106. 
 242  KOH, supra note 90, at 14 (noting that international legal norms and 
principles have taken hold in the United States). 
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national governments . . . . [It] has evolved into a hybrid body of 
international and domestic law developed by a large number of 
public and private transnational actors.” 243   In The Trump 
Administration and International Law, Harold Hongju Koh, a former 
Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State,244 argues that “these 
many actors make and remake transnational law . . . by generating 
interactions that lead to interpretations of international law that 
become internalized into, and thereby binding under, domestic 
law . . . .”245  These default rules become “difficult to deviate from 
without sustained effort.”246  For example, the Space Force may use 
existing international law as a gap filler for any “new and 
unanticipated factual circumstance, . . . [with] a good-faith effort to 
translate from the spirit of existing rules of laws (e.g., the laws of 
war) to new situations . . . .”247  The end game for the United States 
should be to partner with other States to develop a new international 
treaty for reasonable and lawful space warfare.248 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The unpredictability of the world—from widespread concerns 
on security, climate change, natural disasters, and “unforeseen 
developments caused by technological breakthroughs, extreme 
human actions, and outbreaks of health hazards”—make a stable 
Space Force indispensable. 249   Safeguarding space with a robust 
regulatory regime “will be of quintessence importance to avert 
dangers of serious economic imbalances or disastrous conflicts and 
wars.”250  The Space Force will need to be ahead of the curve, and 
should see that with great public and private economic 
 
 243 KOH, supra note 90, at 6-7 (italics omitted).  More specifically, “sovereign 
and nonsovereign actors include [the United States’] allies; state, municipalities, 
and localities of the United States; government bureaucracies; the media; courts; 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); 
and committed individuals.”  KOH, supra note 90, at 7. 
 244  Harold Hongju Koh, YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/harold-
hongju-koh [https://perma.cc/TN6R-EV6Y] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). 
 245 KOH, supra note 90, at 7 (emphasis in original). 
 246 KOH, supra note 90, at 7. 
 247 KOH, supra note 90, at 10. 
 248 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 226–27 (providing an example of a potential 
ban on exotic space-to-ground weaponry). 
 249 Murthi & Gopalakrishnan, supra note 141, at 29–30. 
 250 Murthi & Gopalakrishnan, supra note 141, at 42. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/4
2021] In, From, and to Space:  Safeguarding the United States 1199 
opportunities, such as space tourism, comes great risk and 
responsibility.251  The Space Force attorneys will have their work cut 
out for them, but will certainly rise to the challenge. 
 
 251 ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 273–74. 
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